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Abstract
This paper examines common regulation as cause of interbank contagion. Studies
based on the correlation of bank assets and the extent of interbank lending may un-
derestimate the likelihood of contagion because they do not incorporate the fact that
banks have a common regulator. In our model, the failure of one bank can undermine
the public’s conﬁdence in the competence of the banking regulator, and hence in other
banks chartered by the same regulator. Thus depositors may withdraw funds from
other, unconnected, banks. The optimal regulatory response to this ‘panic’ behaviour
can be to privately exhibit forbearance to the initially failing bank in the hope that it -
and hence other vulnerable banks - survives. By contrast, public bailouts are ineffec-
tive in preventing panics and must be bolstered by other measures such as increased
deposit insurance coverage. Regulatory transparency improves conﬁdence ex ante but
impedes regulators’ ability to stem panics ex post.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21, G28
Keywords: Contagion, Reputation, Bank Regulation5
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Non-technical summary
In this paper we show that regulator reputation is a conduit for ﬁnancial contagion. We show that even when
there is no interbank lending and the returns on the assets in which two banks invest are uncorrelated, the
failure of the ﬁrst bank may cause depositors to withdraw from, or refuse to invest their funds in, the second
bank. The reason for this is that if the regulator’s initial reputation is sufﬁciently mediocre, a failure may
cause depositors to lose conﬁdence altogether in her ability to discriminate between good and bad banks, and
thus in the quality of the second bank. As a result, the second bank may fail because of contagion arising
from a drop in the regulator’s reputation, even if the “fundamentals” of the second bank are apparently
unchanged.
Conventional empirical models attempt to estimate the likelihood of contagion between banks examine
the possibility of a “domino effect” of the type envisaged by Allen and Gale (2000). That is, they ask
whether a chain of interbank lending linkages might cause the failure of one bank to endanger the survival
of its creditor banks, and, in turn, the survival of their creditors. The implication of our model is that studies
of this type underestimate the probability of contagion because they do not take into account the possibility
of reputational contagion. The failure of one bank could cause depositors to reduce their estimate of the
banking regulator’s ability to keep unsound banks out of the system. As a result, they could withdraw their
funds from other banks with a common regulator; this effect could destabilise the entire banking system.
A key ingredient of our model is that depositors do not capture all of the returns from depositing. Some
of the proﬁts generated from a deposit accrue to the bank that manages the deposit, rather than to the
depositor. Banker proﬁts have been controversial of late, but bankers must receive some form of incentive
pay if they invest wisely and their investments succeed. Without such pay, they would have little incentive
to exert themselves to select and monitor investments. In our model, banker incentive payments reduce the
return that depositors receive on their investments. In a more general model, depositor returns would be
further reduced by incentive payments to the entrepreneurs and the ﬁrms funded by the banker.
We assume that the banking regulator aims to maximise social welfare. Because depositors are unable
to capture all the returns from their deposits, they place a lower value on depositing than the regulator.
Reputational contagion may cause depositors to withdraw from the banking sector even though it would be
preferable from a social point of view if they did not. In this situation, the regulator attempts to avoid the
withdrawal by managing her reputation so as to avoid reputational contagion. She does this by limiting the
information that the public has about bank failure that might result in reputational contagion. For example,
suppose the regulator audits Bank 1 and learns that it is unsound. If she closes Bank 1 then the depositors
will downgrade their assessment of her abilities, and so will run on Bank 2. It may be socially better for her
privately to forebear on Bank 1, keeping the information learned through the audit secret: Bank 2 can then
survive, provided that Bank 1 also manages to pull through. We show that such private forbearance can be
a socially optimal policy.
Such secret rescues have been conducted by Central Banks in the past. An increasing emphasis on
transparency in regulation and supervision over the last couple of decades has made secret rescues difﬁcult,
however. Many bank rescues in the 2007-9 crisis were carried out in the glare of publicity. Such publicity
has costs in our model, because a public rescue is an insufﬁcient response to a loss of conﬁdence, unless it is
bolstered by other conﬁdence-restoring measures such as an increase in the generosity of deposit insurance6
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or a tightening of capital requirements. Transparency is therefore a costly policy once a problem has oc-
curred. However, committing up-front to a policy of transparency has a beneﬁt because it makes depositors
more conﬁdent that the regulator will be unable privately to forbear (that is, to conceal information that
would make the depositors want to withdraw their funds from a bank), and so makes them more willing to
deposit.7
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1. Introduction
In this paper we show that regulator reputation is a conduit for ﬁnancial contagion. We show that even when
the returns on the assets in which two banks invest are uncorrelated, and there is no interbank lending, the
failure of the ﬁrst bank may cause depositors to withdraw or refuse to invest their funds in the second bank.
The reason behind this is that, if the regulator’s initial reputation is sufﬁciently mediocre, a failure may cause
depositors to lose conﬁdence altogether in her ability to discriminate between good and bad banks, and thus
in the quality of the second bank. Therefore the second bank may fail because of contagion arising from a
drop in the regulator’s reputation, even if the “fundamentals” of the second bank are apparently unchanged.
Our paper provides a contrast with previous models of ﬁnancial contagion, which have focussed on
contagion arising from one of two sources: interbank lending or correlation in the returns on the banks’
underlying asset base. In the ﬁrst class of models, starting with Allen & Gale (2000), banks may suffer
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and hold interbank deposits as a way of insuring against these. Ex post illiquid
banks draw down their deposits in ex post liquid banks to meet depositors’ short term liquidity demands.
An unfortunate consequence of this is that if there is an aggregate liquidity shock, all banks will try to
liquidate their interbank deposits, resulting in contagion across the system which would be absent if banks
were prevented from holding interbank deposits. This suggests that if the threat of an aggregate liquidity
shock is large enough, excessive interbank deposit deposits should be avoided as they are a threat to the
stability of the system. Leitner (2005), however, shows that even if aggregate shocks are the only type of
shock to hit the system, interbank lending can nevertheless be desirable in that it helps commit banks to help
other ailing banks ex post when it is difﬁcult to contract ex ante on providing such assistance. In his model,
the role of the regulator is to coordinate private sector bailouts; such bailouts are feasible precisely when in
the absence of an organised bailout banks face the threat of contagion.
Several more recent papers examine liquidity shocks and interbank lending in greater detail. Heider,
Hoerova & Holthausen (2009) argue that liquidity crises arise when adverse selection problems between
banks become acute. In their paper, the interbank market breaks down when risk levels are heightened and
the quality of individual banks is unknown, so that sound banks elect to hoard liquidity rather than to lend
it in the interbank market. Indeed, the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis was characterised by heightened uncertainty
regarding counterparty risk (see Gorton (2009) for a discussion of counterparty uncertainty in the market
for mortgate-backed securities). In Diamond & Rajan (2009), liquidity shocks arise because households
withdraw from banks; this results in high real interest rates, which in turn diminish investment. Diamond
and Rajan show that any subsidy to correct this problem should be paid for by taxes on non-depositors, so as
to ensure that it is not immediately reversed by further withdrawals. Freixas, Martin & Skeie (2009) argue
that the optimal regulatory response to aggregate liquidity shocks involves monetary policy. They show that
interest rates should be lowered during a crisis so as as to discourage liquidity hoarding; to ensure that there
are adequate levels of liquidity in the banking system, they argue that short term rates in normal times should
be high. In related work, Allen, Carletti & Gale (2009) show that the price volatility caused by uncertain
aggregate liquidity requirements is welfare reductive, and argue that this problem can be resolved through
appropriate Open Market operations.
Rochet & Tirole (1996) have a different answer to the question of why regulators allow extensive in-
terbank lending when this seems to increase the risk of a systemic failure. They argue that banks have8
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superior ability to monitor one anothers’ soundness, but that they will have incentives to do so only if they
are engaged in signiﬁcant lending to one another. Interbank lending thus has the advantage that each bank is
forced to behave well or else it will not be able to borrow from other banks. However, because in their model
banks monitor ‘in a circle’, if one bank fails this indicates that its monitor has failed to monitor properly;
that the monitor’s monitor has failed to monitor the monitor, and so on, resulting in a systemic meltdown.
Our model is in contrast to this ﬁrst class of models since we simplify by assuming that there is no interbank
lending or monitoring. Instead, the regulator should be monitoring the banks, and contagion can still occur
despite the lack of interbank lending, because a failure of one bank may signal that the regulator has not
been performing his monitoring function very effectively; in turn, this can lead depositors to question the
soundness of other banks in the same regulatory system.
The second class of models of systemic banking failures focus on the idea that the assets in bank porfo-
lios are correlated, for example because banks within a country or region all invest in particular industries or
regions. Crises occur when these assets have low returns so in a sense, this type of crisis is not really driven
by contagion across banks per se, but by fundamental shocks hitting all banks at the same time. For an
example of such a model, see Acharya (2001). Other models that recognise the agency problem that exists
between asset managers and their employers (e.g. Scharfstein & Stein (1990)) can also be applied to the
banking industry to show that in the face of yardstick type performance evaluation by bank investors, bank
managers may have incentives to invest in assets which are too correlated from a social point of view. Nev-
ertheless, contagion can occur in this type of situation if depositors are aware that bank assets are correlated
and are unable to distinguish idiosyncratic from system-wide shocks. In Chari & Jagannathan (1988), for
example, some depositors are informed about the true state of a bank’s assets, and others are uninformed.
Whenanuninformeddepositorobservesanotherdepositorqueueingtowithdrawhisdepositsinabankearly,
he is concerned that this may be for informational rather than personal liquidity reasons, and is inclined to
join the queue himself. This can lead to a contagion effect across depositors and, in some circumstances, to
an inefﬁcient bank run. It is easy to see how the same type of effect could occur across banks if investors
believe that bank assets are correlated, so that queues at one bank could signal that investors have bad news
about the value of the fundamental asset held by both banks.
Acharya, Shin & Yorulmazer (2009) explain co-movement in asset prices as a consequence of restricted
levels of arbitrage capital. In their work, capital moves slowly into impaired assets because its investment
is limited by the level of investor expertise. This causes asset ﬁre sales in crises, which push up the returns
to investment in impaired assets, and so reduce the equilibrium prices of other investments. In a sense,
our model can be seen as endogenising the correlation of returns on bank assets not through slow moving
arbitrage capital, herding or other strategic behaviour on the part of banks, nor through the assumption of
common investment opportunities or information. We abstract from all of these yet depositors rationally
anticipate that returns on bank deposits are correlated because how well the bank performs is a function of
the regulator’s ability and the banks share a common regulator.
An extensive empirical literature attempts to quantify and compare the two sources of systemic risk
mentioned above. The extent of contagion that might arise from inter-bank lending is usually assessed by
taking actual or conjectured data on interbank exposures and “stress testing” it, by assuming that one or
several banks’ assets are impaired, and investigating the knock-on impact of this on other banks (see, for
example, Mistrulli (2007) or Degryse & Nguyen (2007)). However, our model suggests that the risk of9
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contagion may be underestimated by these studies, which do not take into account the effect of a bank
failure on depositor conﬁdence in the regulator. An alternative approach uses stock price information on
banks. Hartmann, Straetmans & de Vries (2005) perform a detailed analysis of domestic and cross-border
contagion among US and European banks 1992-2004, using techniques from multivariate extreme value
theory to assess the probability of a crash in one bank’s stock price conditional on other bank stocks or the
market crashing. They ﬁnd greater contagion risk among US than European banks, even though interbank
exposures are typically higher in Europe, mainly because the risk of contagion between European banks
in different countries is relatively low. According to our model, one might also explain this ﬁnding by
the fact that banks in different European countries have different regulators. They also ﬁnd that contagion
risk seems to increase over time, perhaps because of greater ﬁnancial integration. More recently, Gropp,
Lo Duca & Vesala (2009) assess European banks’ exposure to cross-border contagion by estimating the
probability of a large change in a bank’s distance to default as a function of large changes in foreign banks’
distance to default using data from 1994-2003. They ﬁnd evidence of cross-border contagion between large
European banks, but not between small ones, and they ﬁnd some evidence that contagion was increased by
the introduction of the euro. The strength of these studies is that in using stock price data rather than data
on interbank lending, they can in principle capture all the sources of contagion which affect equity holders.
The weakness - as Gropp et al point out - is that they are estimated over relatively calm periods, so if some
shocks do not occur during that period, the risk of contagion from these shocks may be understated.
As they stand, these studies also do not make a strong distinction between the different sources of
contagion affecting banks, although in principle, with sufﬁcient data, their method might allow this. For
example, if interbank lending is what drives contagion, then the extent one of contagion between two banks
should be related to the extent of interbank exposure between them. Similary, since in both Europe and
in the US, some banks have different regulators to others (e.g., in Europe, bank regulation takes place at a
national level whereas in the US, some banks are regulated by the Federal Reserve and others are regulated
by the OCC) it should be possible to consider whether two banks with a common regulator have a greater
correlation of shocks, ceteris paribus.
On the other hand, one might argue that behind the current crisis is a loss of faith in both US and
EU regulators. Under the Basle II Accord, regulators rely heavily on ratings information to assess capital
requirements, and ratings have recently been found to be unreliable for the structured ﬁnance assets held on
and off-balance sheet by many banks (Coval, Jurek & Stafford (2009)). We would argue that the numerous
recent bank rescues in the EU and US can be understood as at least partly designed to maintain depositor
conﬁdence in the banking system as a whole. In particular, the analysis in this paper shows that it may be
socially optimal to rescue a bank not because it is systemically important in the traditional sense (that is,
not because it necessarily has large interbank exposures, although it may have these as well) but because
its failure would do undue damage to the regulator’s reputation and might undermine depositor conﬁdence
in other banks for that reason. Why, for example, did the UK government rescue the Northern Rock Bank
in September 2007? Or the German government rescue Hypo Real Estate? Whilst interbank linkages are
not public information, in neither case did any argument appear in the press that these banks were rescued
because they were too “connected” to be allowed to fail (in contrast to the bailout of AIG, for example).
Instead, government ofﬁcials talked about how it was important to maintain depositor conﬁdence in the
ﬁnancial system, an argument consistent with the ﬁnding of this paper that sometimes it may be socially10
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optimal (at least ex post once the crisis has occurred) to forebear rather than admit that there had been a
failure of regulation.1
The importance of maintaining depositor conﬁdence in the regulatory system has been emphasised by
Kane (1989b), in a different context. Discussing the State’s decision to bail out the Ohio Deposit Insurance
Fund event though in fact, contrary to popular belief at the time the State was not in fact a guarantor of this
fund, Kane argues that it was nevertheless important for the State to step in because the public implicitly
deemed the State responsible for the losses as it had failed in its regulatory duty. We ﬁnd that the type
of forbearance decisions taken in the Ohio case, and in the Savings and Loans Crisis can be part of an ex
post optimal policy response. The regulator’s reputation as a competent monitor is socially valuable and it
behoves him to do what he can to conserve it; this may even include “gambling for resurrection”. In the case
of the Savings and Loans crisis, Kane (1989a) and Rom (1996) also argue that the incentives provided by the
system must bear a greater proportion of the blame than the actions of individuals for what was, in hindsight,
enormously expensive failed gamble, although Kane can claim credit for having predicted the outcome and
would also argue that individuals have a moral duty not to succumb to the incentives the system creates. We
show that, given that the regulator learns bad news about a bank’s prospects, social welfare may actually be
higher if the regulator is able secretly to exhibit forbearance towards this bank and hope that its investments
recover. However, if the public anticipates such behaviour in advance, they will be more circumspect in
investing their deposits initially, so that ex ante welfare may be higher if the regulator can commit to adopt
a tough policy in such situations.
The central importance of the regulator’s concern with his reputation in our model makes it similar to
Boot & Thakor (1993). However, in their model the regulator’s reputational concern is purely selﬁsh, so
that regulatory forbearance is never an optimal policy. In our model, by contrast, when regulator reputation
is intermediate, forbearance can sometimes be in the public interest. The key insight is that depositors
do not capture all of the the social beneﬁts associated with bank investment when they decide whether to
deposit. Therefore it can be socially valuable for the banking system to exist even when depositors choose
to withdraw. If a regulator’s bad information about a bank is made public, in a situation where depositors are
already somewhat uncertain about the regulator’s competence, this information can cause them to withdraw
their funds when it would be socially preferrable for them to wait and see whether the adverse event indeed
materialises. By contrast, if the regulator’s initial reputation is strong enough, he can afford to deal swiftly
in closing a bank on the arrival of bad news without conﬁdence in other banks deteriorating too severely.
So forbearance is an optimal policy only for regulators in whom the public already lacks conﬁdence. The
appropriate degree of forbearance therefore depends on the level of regulator reputation. Differently from
Boot & Thakor (1993), regulators whose reputation is marginally acceptable should optimally forbear less
than their more competent peers.
1According to http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7653868.stm, the German government argued that it had acted to stop Hypo Real
Estate’s collapse in order to avoid "incalculably large" damage to Germany and ﬁnancial services providers in Europe; after an
emergency meeting with the central bank, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: "We tell all savings account holders that your
deposits are safe. The federal government assures it." UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Alisdair Darling said that the decision
to guarantee all deposits at Northern Rock (not just the amounts covered by the UK deposit insurance scheme) came because he
wanted "to put the matter beyond doubt" and "because of the importance I place on maintaining a stable banking system and public
conﬁdence in it". The Financial Services Authority chairman Callum McCarthy welcomed the move, commenting, "The purpose
of this is not to save Northern Rock per se... It’s to make sure that there’s not a negative effect on the banking system overall," see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6999615.stm.11
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2. The Model
We develop our argument in a simple two period model of a world populated by two types of risk-neutral
agent: bankers and depositors. Period 1 runs from time 0 to time 1; period 2 runs from time 1 to time 2.
Each depositor starts each period with an endowment of $1, which he can invest in one of two ways.
First, he can place it in a riskless storage technology which yields a certain return of r. Second, he can invest
it in a bank.
Banks are run by bankers, each of whom is endowed with a constant returns to scale project which
occurs in either period 1 or period 2. Bankers in this model have no capital endowment. Projects return R
per dollar invested if they succeed, and they otherwise return 0. A fraction σ of bankers are endowed with
a monitoring technology: we refer to these bankers as sound, and to the remaining (1−σ) as unsound. The
effect of the monitoring technology is to increase the success probability of the project: one can think of
monitoring as including activities such as advising the (unmodelled) project manager, eradicating agency
problems, and so on. The success probability of projects is pL if they are not monitored by the banker, and
it is pH = pL+Δp > pL if they are monitored. The cost of monitoring a project is C per dollar invested in
it, and monitoring is unobservable.
The relationship between the depositors and their bank is governed by a deposit contract, under the
terms of which the banker pays the depositor a deposit rate of R−Q if the project succeeds and 0 otherwise.
The banker therefore earns a fee Q in the event that his bank succeeds. Bankers in our model have no capital
and hence payments to depositors are impossible in case their projects fail.2 There is no deposit insurance.
We assume that
RpH > r > RpL, (1)
so depositors prefer investing in a sound bank to investing in the storage technology, and in turn prefer the
storage technology to an unsound bank.
Suppose that depositors select a bank at random. If sound banks monitor, depositors’ expected return
from depositing in a randomly-selected bank will be (R−Q)(pL+σΔp): they will choose not to deposit if






Equation (2) implies that in the absence of additional intervention, depositing is on average less socially pro-
ductive than investment in the storage technology, and hence that all depositors will place their endowments
in the storage technology.
We now introduce a regulator. In this simple model the regulator’s only tool is an imperfect screening
technology which allows her to distinguish between sound and unsound bankers.3 Equation (2) implies
that without regulation of this sort, there can be no banking sector. Note that, in the absence of any other
regulatory activity, the regulator’s role could be performed by a private screening body such as a ratings
agency. However, when in section 4 we consider regulatory forbearance, the regulator is given the power
2We consider the impact of capital requirements in Morrison & White (2005).
3We examine the use of capital requirements and deposit insurance in related work: see Morrison & White (2005) and Morrison
& White (2004).12
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to audit and to close failing banks. As we argue in the conclusion, this role is harder to delegate to a third
party.
The regulator uses her technology to allocate banking licences. Since we wish to show that it may in
some circumstances be socially optimal for the regulator to forebear on failing banks, we assume that she
has no selﬁsh career-type concerns. We simply assume that the regulator aims to maximize social welfare,
as measured by the total expected output from the economy. If the screening technology is sufﬁciently good,
the expected gross return from bank investment will exceed that from investment in the storage technology
and so the socially ﬁrst best outcome will be for all funds to be invested in the banking system. On the other
hand, if the screening technology is poor, the banking system has no social value and value is maximised by
potential depositors using the storage technology instead.
Although the regulator has no career concerns, our results are driven by her socially optimal concern
for her reputation. We therefore assume that the same regulator is appointed for both periods of our model.
For simplicity, we assume that she allocates a total of two bank licences. Bank 1 receives its licence at time
0, when it collects deposits and invests. Bank 1 operates for one period: it closes and pays returns to its
depositors at time 1. Bank 2 operates from time 1 to time 2. Our substantive results would be unchanged if
both banks operated throughout periods 1 and 2, but the algebra would be signiﬁcantly more complex.
Thelicencesareawardedinthefollowingway. Theregulatorexaminesbankersoneatatimeandawards
a licence to the ﬁrst one for whom her technology returns a positive signal. Regulatory technologies are of






regulators have a technology which sends the wrong signal with probability 1
2. At time 0 no one, including
the regulator, knows which type of technology she has. All agents assign a common prior probability α that
she is good. We refer to α as the regulator’s reputation.
The regulator’s reputation is updated in response to any signals which the depositors receive about bank
1’s performance and the updated reputation will inform their attitude towards bank 2. We examine the
updating process and its impact upon the period 2 bank in the following sections. In section 3 we assume
that the regulator has no advance warning of impending bank 1 failure, and hence that she cannot act to
prevent it. We demonstrate that in this case, the failure of bank 1 can result in the contagious failure of
bank 2, even when such a run is socially undesirable. In section 4 we allow the regulator to intervene to
close failing banks. We show that concerns about reputational ﬁnancial contagion can cause the regulator to
exhibit forbearance, failing to close bank 1 although this would be myopically optimal. Such forbearance is
socially optimal, even though closure of a failing bank is always a positive net present value action, because
maintaining the regulator’s reputation has social value. In section 5 we analyze an extension of our model, in
which regulators can acquire a reputation for competent auditing of extant banks, and we show that concern
for this reputation can in some circumstances override the regulator’s concern for her ex ante screening
reputation. Section 6 concludes.
3. Contagious Bank Failures
We start by considering the contract that a bank will offer its depositors. Recall from equation (1) that
depositors will invest in a bank only if it elects to monitor its investments. Since monitoring is unobservable,
it will occur only if the return Q(pL+Δp)−C from monitoring exceeds the return QpL from not doing so:13
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It is convenient to deﬁne w(α) to be the probability which the regulator and the depositors assign to the
event that a reputation α regulator’s screening technology yields the wrong signal: in other words, that she






2 ≥ w(α) ≥ γ, and w (α)=γ −1/2 < 0.
When the regulator is wrong with probability w we write π(w) for the probability which the regulator
and the depositors place upon the bank being sound. Then using Bayes’ rule,








Finally, let UD(wt) and UR(wt) be the respective per-period utilities which the depositors and the regu-
lator derive from the time t bank:
UD(w)=( R−Q)(pL+π(w)Δp); (6)
UR(w)=R(pL+π(w)Δp)−π(w)C. (7)
Lemma 1 establishes some simple but useful facts aboutUD(w) and UR(w):




We assume that banking is socially desirable when α = 1 and that it is not when α = 0: in other words,








SinceUD(w)<UR(w), therecanbetoolittledepositing, buttherecanneverbetoomuch. Equation8implies
that depositing will never occur when α = 0. We assume in addition that UD(γ) > r, so that conditional






Banking is possible for some regulator reputation precisely when equations (3) and (9) can be satisﬁed








We adopt equation (10) as an assumption.14
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Figure 1: UD and UR are the utilities of depositors and regulators, respectively. If regulator reputation falls



















Figure 2: αR and αD are threshholds for the regulator’s reputation, α. When α < αR, the regulator and
the depositor would both prefer the banking sector to close; when α ≥ αD, the regulator and the depositor
would both prefer the banking sector to remain open. For reputation levels between αR and αD, the depositor
would prefer not to depositor, even though it is socially optimal for depositing to occur.
Figure 1 plots the respective regulator and depositor welfaresUR andUD as a function of the probability
w of regulator error. We know from lemma 1 that both functions are monotone decreasing withUR dropping
faster than UD, and we know from equations (8) and (9) that both exceed r for w = γ and both are less than
r for w = 1
2. Hence each curve has a unique intersection with r: we denote the intersection point of UD by
wD, and the intersection point of UR by wR. Throughout the paper, terms that represent indifference points
for depositors and for the regulator are represented with D and R subscripts, respectively.
For wD < w ≤ wR banking is socially valuable (UR > r), but depositors are unwilling to deposit (UD < r)
and hence there is no banking sector. This is because depositors receive only a fraction Q < R of the returns
on successful bank investments and so fail fully to internalise their social beneﬁts. We write αD and αR for
the regulator reputations that correspond to the error probabilities wD and wR. Figure 2 illustrates αR and
αD; the intermediate reputation range αR < α ≤ αD in which banking is socially desirable but depositors
are unwilling to deposit corresponds to the error probability range wD < w ≤ wR . Expressions for wD, wR,
αD and αR are derived in the appendix.
We now show that when ﬁrst period reputation α > αD, so that ﬁrst period banking is possible, updating
of regulatory reputation in the wake of ﬁrst period bank failure may result in second period bank failure,15
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even when this is socially suboptimal. We start by describing the process by which reputations are updated
in the wake of bank failure: lemma 2 provides expressions for the updated reputation.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that in either period, the regulator’s reputation is α when bank licences are allocated.







(1− pH)σ (1−γ)+(1− pL)γ(1−σ)
σ −2σγ+γ
(12)
is the probability that the bank fails conditional upon the regulator being good, and
φB =( 1− pH)σ +(1− pL)(1−σ) (13)
is the probability that the bank fails conditional upon the regulator being bad. Moreover, α 
F (α) > 0:a s
the prior reputation drops, so does the posterior reputation after failure.
Clearly, if αF (α) < αD then ﬁrst period bank failure will result in second period closure of the banking
sector. This closure occurs not because the depositors have made a direct observation of some property of
the second period banks, but because they have learned something about the regulator, and hence about the
average quality of the second period banks. Hence, regulatory reputation serves in this model as a conduit






Then αF (αC)=αD. Let α denote the ﬁrst period regulator reputation. If αD < α < αC then ﬁrst period
banking will occur, but ﬁrst period bank failure will cause a contagious closure of the second period banking
sector. Moreover, if αF (α) > αR, this contagion is socially damaging.
Proof: Only the statement about αC requires proof. It is derived by setting αF (α) equal to αD, and solving
for α. 
We have derived our results in this section in a simple model in which regulators cannot intervene in the
banking sector after they have allocated banking licences. In the next section we extend our model to
incorporate an ex post role for regulatory auditing.
4. Regulatory Forbearance
In the previous section, the regulator could only screen bank licence applicants, but could do nothing once a
bank was chartered and its investments were in place. In this section, we introduce an auditing role for the
regulator. We assume that at an interim date, after bank investments have been made, she is able to audit the
bank to determine for sure whether it is sound or unsound. In addition, we endow her with the power to close
the bank at this stage it if this is socially optimal (for example, if she learns that the bank is unsound). The
contagion effects highlighted in proposition 1 carry through to the richer model of this section. In addition,16
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we can show that, although closing an unsound bank has a positive net present value, the regulator may in
some cases neglect to do so because of concern regarding the impact on her reputation.
Regulatory auditing consists of such activities as scrutinising the books of the bank and examining its
risk management systems. For the purposes of our model, we assume that the auditing technology each type
of regulator possesses yields with probability λ a perfect signal of banker type.4 The signal is accompanied
by hard and veriﬁable data if the banker is unsound, but not if he is sound. This data allows the regulator
to close down the bank, in which case a return L is realised per dollar invested, and is distributed amongst
the bank’s depositors. We assume that closure of banks is impossible without hard evidence, and hence that
closure will never occur unless the audit has returned a poor signal. We assume that
r > L > RpL. (14)
Hence the regulator will never wish to close down a sound bank (which is expected to return Rp_{L}>r),
and ceteris paribus would prefer to close down an unsound bank (which is expected to return Rp_{L} if it
remains open).
We start by considering the second period. Since the game ends at the end of this period, the regulator
has no reputational concerns and hence closes bank 2 precisely when their interim audit returns a bad signal.
Analogous to equations (6) and (7), we can write WD(w) and WR(w) for the respective expected time 1
utilities of the depositor and the regulator when the regulator’s screening is wrong with probability w:
WD(w)=UD(w)+(1−π(w))λ (L−(R−Q)pL); (15)
WR(w)=UR(w)+(1−π(w))λ (L−RpL). (16)
The following results are analogous to those of lemma 1.




Note in addition that WD(w) > UD(w) and UR(w) > WR(w): the ability to audit renders depositing more
attractive, and it raises aggregate welfare. It follows from equation 8 that there will always be a second
period banking sector for sufﬁciently high time 1 reputation, α. We assume in addition that second period





(1−σ)(r−L+(1−λ)(L−RpL)) > σ (RpH −C−r). (17)
In this section, we denote indifference points for regulators and depositors with subscripts LR and LD
respectively, where we use the L preﬁx to indicate that early liquidation is possible. Again by analogy to
section 3, there exist regulator reputations αLR and αLD, with αLR < αLD, such that the regulator prefers not
to open a banking sector when her time 1 reputation is lower than αLR, and the depositors refuse to deposit
when the time 1 regulator reputation is lower than αLD. αLR and αLD correspond to the values αL and αD
that are illustrated in ﬁgure 2. Since WR > UR and WD > UD it is clear that αLR < αR and αLD < αD:i n
other words, when there is a chance that unsound banks will be liquidated after they are audited, this raises
4Thus the auditing technology is independent of the regulator’s type. Relaxing this assumption would have little qualitative
effect upon our results, but it would signiﬁcantly complicate the analysis. In section 5** we allow the regulator to have a reputation
for auditing as well as screening, so that some regulators are believed to be more competent auditors than others.17
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expected returns from the banking sector and both the depositors and the regulator will accept a banking
system with a lower regulator reputation. We denote the error probabilities that correspond to αLR and αLD
by wLR and wLD, respectively: expressions for wLR, αLR, wLD and αLD appear in the appendix.
We now consider the effect of a closure upon regulator reputation. Lemma 4 provides a formula for the
regulator’s posterior reputation. Recall from equation (11) that αF (α) is the regulator’s posterior reputation
after a bank failure. We write αL(α) for the regulator’s posterior reputation after she liquidates a bank.
Lemma (4) describes αF and αL.
LEMMA 4. Suppose that the regulator has a prior reputation of α. Then her posterior reputation after she






Moreover, αL(α) < αF (α).
The second part of this result says that the regulator’s posterior reputation αL after a liquidation is worse
than her posterior reputation αF after a failure. The intuition is simple. When closure occurs, the depositors
learn that the regulator knows for certain that the bank was unsound: this is a worse signal than a bank
failure, which could occur with a sound bank. Hence αL(α) < αF (α).
We are now examine the circumstances under which our social maximising regulator chooses to forebear









Expressions for these terms appear in the appendix. The asterix superscript coupled with theC subscript
indicates a reputation that is updated to an indifference point; the agent to whom the indifference point
applies is indicated by the second term in the subscript.
Whenever α < α∗
CD, second period banking will be impossible if the regulator decides to close bank 1
at the interim date. This is because α∗
CD is the period 1 reputation from which interim bank closure causes
depositors to update their assessment of the regulator’s reputation to a level at which they are just indifferent
between investing in a period 2 bank and investing in the outside option. Any lower initial reputation and
depositors would not be willing to invest in bank 2 after bank 1 is closed.
Note that when the interim period 1 audit demonstrates that the period 1 bank was unsound, the regulator
updates her prior over her reputation to αL(α) irrespective of whether she actually closes the bank. α∗
CR is
the prior reputation after which this update will leave her indifferent between maintaining a period 2 banking
sector, and closing it down. Hence, the regulator will prefer to close down the period 2 banking sector after




LR and α 
L(α) > 0, we have that α∗
CD > α∗
CR. If the initial reputation α is such that
α∗
CD > α > α∗
CR, the closure of an unsound period 1 bank will result in closure of the period 2 banking18
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Figure 3: Reputational updating when regulators can audit. It is socially optimal to close banks after
an audit reveals low type when the posterior regulator reputation is less than α∗
LR; depositors will withdraw
their funds when the posterior reputation is less than αLD > αLR. Hence, when the posterior reputation is
between αLR and αLD it may be socially optimal to forbeat on a low quality ﬁrst period bank.
sector, even though this is a socially undesirable outcome. To avoid this, the regulator could instead forbear
on an unsound period 1 bank: in other words, she could elect not to close it, even though closure is positive
NPV from the perspective of the ﬁrst period bank. In exchange for giving up the value L−RpL of early
liquidation payoff, the regulator may manage to maintain a second period banking sector. For convenience,
we refer to an economy in which this is the regulator’s best action as exhibiting a forbearance equilibrium.
Note that in a forbearance equilibrium, depositors will extract no information from a regulator’s failure
to close the period 1 bank at the interim date. If the ﬁrst period bank fails they will therefore update their




Once again, the asterix supercript on α∗
FD indicates that it is a prior reputation that is updated to an indif-
ference point; the F subscript indicates that the relevant update is in the wake of a period 1 bank failure in
a forebearance equilibrium. In other words, α∗
FD is the prior reputation at which period 1 bank failure in a
forbearance equilibrium leaves depositors indifferent between investing in a period 2 bank, and taking their
outside option. In other words, period 1 bank failure results in closure of the second period banking sector
precisely when α < α∗
FD. It follows from lemma 4 that α∗
FD < α∗
CD.
The updating process is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Recall that αLR and αLD are the time 1 regulatory reputa-
tions below which the regulator and the depositors, respectively, regard bank 2 as untenable. The regulator
updates her own reputation after learning from an audit that the period 1 bank is unsound; if her prior rep-
utation is α∗
CR then it will be αLR after updating. The depositors update their assessment of the regulator’s
reputation after observing a liquidation; they will be indifferent between depositing and not depositing after19
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updating if their prior assessment of the regulator’s reputation is α∗
CD. In the region α∗
CD > α > α∗
CR, the
regulator would prefer not to close the banking system after observing an unsound banker and updating her
own assessment of her reputation, but she knows that liquidating the unsound Bank 1 would result in the
failure of Bank 2. Hence, as discussed above, she may elect to forbear on the ﬁrst period unsound banker in
order to maintain a second period banking sector.
The region in which forbearance might potentially occur can be divided into two parts. First, there
is the region where the prior reputation α is less than α∗
FD, so that failure of a ﬁrst period banker causes
the regulator’s reputation to be updated to a level below αLD, and the banking system closes in the second
period. Hence, if the regulator forbears when α < α∗
FD, she is relying upon the success of an unsound bank
to ensure the survival of the banking sector. We refer to this behaviour as gambling for resurrection.I t
transpires that gambling for resurrection is never socially optimal:
LEMMA 5. The socially optimal policy when α <α∗
FDis to liquidate every bank that is revealed by an audit
to be unsound.
Proof: If the regulator forbears on a period 1 bank the expected return from that bank is RpL. When
α < α∗
FD, there will be a second period banking sector with probability pL, precisely when the ﬁrst period
bank succeeds. If there is a second period banking sector, the regulator uses the updated reputation αL(α) to
assess it, since she has observed that the period 1 bank is unsound. The expected social surplus generated by
the second period banking sector is therefore pLWR(w(αL(α))). Forbearance is therefore optimal precisely
when condition (19) below is satisﬁed. Since we know that pLWR < pLR < L < r, this is never the case. To
see the ﬁrst of these inequalities, note that from the deﬁnition of WR, pLWR < pLR reduces to π(w)(ΔpR−
C) > R, which is impossible.
{R+WR(w(αL(α)))}pL > L+r. (19)

The second potential forbearance region is the one to the right of α∗
FD in ﬁgure 3. In this region, the prior
reputation α is sufﬁciently low for time 1 liquidation to cause second period closure of the banking sector,
and not so low that time 1 bank failure causes contagious failure of the second period bank. Since in this
case time 1 forbearance cannot cause period 2 bank closure (because failure does not do so), the expected
social return from forbearance increases to RpL+WR(w(αL(α))); the social welfare from closure is L+r.
Hence forbearance is optimal for α∗
FD ≤ α ≤ α∗
CD precisely when condition (20) is satisﬁed:
RpL+WR(w(αL(α))) > L+r. (20)
Note that, as in the proof of lemma 5, the regulator uses the updated reputation αL(α) to make the for-
bearance decision even though the depositors will not update in the forbearance equilibrium. The regulator
makes the same inferences as the depositors, but has more (negative) information. Her decision to forbear
arises because she internalises all of the beneﬁts from monitoring, and the depositors do not.
Note that by deﬁnition, RpL +WR(w(αL(α∗
CR))) = RpL +r < L+r, so condition (20) fails for some
αFBR > α∗
CR. αFBR is less than α∗
FD, so that forbearance occurs throughout the region α∗
FD ≤ α ≤ α∗
CD
precisely when condition (20) is satisﬁed for α = α∗
FD. We prove in the appendix that this is true precisely20
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when condition (21) is satisﬁed:
(RpH −C−L)(1−σ)(r−Lλ −(R−Q)(1−λ)pL)
−(r−RpL)(1−σ)((R−Q)(Δp+λpL)−Lλ)−
((R−Q)pH −r)(L−RpL)(1−λ)(1−σ) > 0. (21)
It is clear from inspection of this condition that it is satisﬁed whenever (r−L) and (L−RpL) are sufﬁciently
small.
Proposition 2 summarises the analysis of this section.
PROPOSITION 2. Let α be the regulator’s interim period 1 public reputation and suppose that that the
regulator learns from the interim audit that the period 1 bank is unsound. Then there exists an αFBR such
that:
1. If α ≥ α∗
CD then the regulator closes down the bank and there is a second period banking sector;
(a) If α∗
CD > α ≥ max(α∗
FD,αFBR) then the regulator forbears and there is a second period banking
sector;
(b) If max(α∗
FD,αFBR) > α then the regulator closes down the bank and there is no second period
banking sector.
In parts 1 and 3 of this proposition, the regulator does not exhibit forbearance. In part 1 this is because the
consequential damage to her reputation does not cause a contagious failure of the second period banking
sector. In part 3 it is because, although she anticipates that the closure will cause a contagious failure of
the second period banking sector, she no longer believes after updating her ﬁrst period priors that a second
period banking sector is socially worthwhile. Hence, in both of these cases, the regulator loses nothing in
the second period by capturing the value L−RpL of closing the ﬁrst period unsound bank.
In our model, when a regulator exercises forbearance on a bank, she does not have to input any funds -
she merely has to allow it to continue its operations when she knows that depositors would be better served
by closing it. However, our model is isomorphic to one where closure yields zero, but the regulator would
have to provide a loan of L at the interim date in order for bank 1 to remain open. This loan would make a
loss of L−RpL in expectation.
4.2. Numerical Example
We have constructed a numerical example of the phenomenon at the center of our analysis in Mathematica.
When R = 2, pL = 0.3, pH = 0.8, L = 0.61, r = 0.85, σ = 0.2, c = 0.3, γ = 0.1, and λ = 0.25, all of the pa-
rameter restrictions that we consider are satisﬁed, and we have α∗
CD =0.9722, αFD=0.9222, α∗
CR =0.8152,
α∗
LD = 0.875 and α∗
LR = 0.4688. Moreover, RpL +WR(w(αL(α∗
FD))) = 0.0717 > 0 for these parameters.
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4.3. Policy Implications
(i) Public versus Private Bailouts
When National Westminster Bank was caught up in the UK secondary banking crisis of 1973, the Bank of
England arranged a secret loan to tide the bank through its difﬁculties. The crisis passed, bank proﬁts recov-
ered and only a few insiders were ever aware of the extent of the banking sector’s difﬁculties. By contrast,
the Bank of England’s support of Northern Rock in September 2007 was all too public. In comments to Par-
liament, Mervyn King remarked that he was unable to arrange secret support of the bank for fear of falling
foul of EU rules on State Aid. These episodes suggest that there may be some beneﬁts to allowing regulators
the scope to effect secret forbearance. Our model allows us to compare the efﬁcacy of such a regime with
one where legislation forces the regulator’s actions and information to be completely transparent.
In a transparent regime, if the regulator is forced to publicise any bad information that he may receive,
then her reputation cannot be saved by forbearing on an unsound bank: her reputation was impaired as soon
as depositors learned that he had chartered an unsound bank. Therefore, the best the regulator can do is
to maximise depositors’ returns by promptly closing the bank and generating L rather than RpL. Since the
regulator who has the power to secretly forbear could have chosen this action and – for reputational values
α ∈ [max(α∗
FD,αFBR),α∗
CD] – chose not to do so, enforcing transparency is clearly strictly worse ex post
than allowing secret bailouts.
Requiring transparency does have an ex ante beneﬁt, however. When the regulator is allowed to un-
dertake secret bailouts, bank 1 can be opened for any value of α > αD. Whereas if secret bailouts are
impossible, bank 1 can be opened for any value of α > αLD, where αD > αLD. This is because when secret
bailouts are impossible, depositors know that if bank 1 is unsound they will receive L rather than only RpL.
Therefore they are more willing to invest, particularly when they have low conﬁdence in the regulator’s
screening ability. This suggests that transparency is important in economies where there is little public trust
in the regulator’s ability; whereas secrecy may be preferable in economies where the regulator is perceived
to be strong.
(ii) Capital Requirements and Deposit insurance
Asremarkedabove, theepisodesof“forbearance”thathavetakenplaceinthecurrentcrisishavebeenplayed
out in a glare of publicity. In our model, such publicity can make it impossible for bank 2 to open. In reality,
it may be intolerable for an economy to suffer such a catastrophic loss of its banking system. Our model
suggests that if the cause of a banking crisis is the reputational loss of the regulator, this damage cannot be
undone overnight but will need to be rebuilt over a number of years. In the meantime, what measures can
be put in place to shore up the banking system?
Morrison & White (2004) show that deposit insurance can be a useful instrument in this setting. In
particular, they demonstrate that when - as here - the banking sector is socially too small, it is beneﬁcial
for the government to provide a subsidised deposit insurance scheme funded out of general taxation to
encourage agents to deposit in banks.5 They also show that deposit insurance should become more generous
as the regulator’s reputation deteriorates. Whilst for simplicity we do not incorporate deposit insurance
5Since everyone is risk neutral, subsidised recapitalisations are an equivalent remedy in their model. Unsubsidised measures,
by contrast, are ineffective.22
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explicitly into the current model, it is easy to see that in the present model it would be appropriate for
the regulator to put in place a subsidised deposit insurance scheme as advocated by Morrison & White
(2004), and further, that if the regulator is forced to publicise bad news at the interim date, then it would be
appropriate to increase the subsidy to the deposit insurance scheme to prevent the collapse of bank 2. This
is the path that most developed country regulators have been following as the current crisis has progressed.
US and UK regulators have also responded to the crisis by instructing the banks under their supervision
to raise more capital. In a static but more complex version of the present model Morrison & White (2005)
demonstrate how tightening capital requirements can be an optimal response to a loss of conﬁdence in
regulatory screening or auditing ability. Introducing capital into the current model would be very involved
because of the need to keep track of how capital requirements are updated as the regulator’s reputation
evolves, but the anaysis of Morrison & White (2005) suggests that tightening the capital requirements that
bank 2 would face can be used to screen out any unsound applicants. In this way, it would be possible to run
a small banking system when depositors have very little conﬁdence in the regulator.
It should be noted, however, that capital requirements and the general taxation supporting subsidised
deposit insurance are costly instruments to use. Therefore the ability to tighten capital requirements or
to raise taxes does not remove the need for reputation management by the regulator. Depending on the
circumstances, it may be that forbearing on a given bank (bank 1) is less costly than raising deposit insurance
or capital requirements for another (bank 2) after the ﬁrst bank has been publicly liquidated.
(iii) Term Limits and the Separation of Regulatory Powers
We have already seen that preventing secret bailouts can be an optimal policy when the regulator’s starting
reputation is below αD but above αLD. One way to ensure that such reputation management does not occur
is to separate the regulatory powers of screening and auditing on the one hand and bank closure on the
other. For example, in the US, many banks are audited by the Federal Reserve or the OCC, but closure
is undertaken by the FDIC. If the FDIC is unconcerned by the Federal Reserve reputation, this would
make it more likely that bank closure will occur when this is socially optimal for depositors, and reduce
forbearance (see Kahn & Santos (2005)). In the United Kingdom, regulatory powers are shared between the
Financial Services Authority, which is responsible for the auditing and licence-granting of our model, the
Bank of England, which has general responsibility for ﬁnancial stability, and the Treasury. This so-called
“Tripartite” system of regulation was criticised in the wake of the 2007 failure of the Northern Rock bank,
because it was apparently unable sufﬁciently rapidly to commit to recapitalise and to bail out the Northern
Rockbank. Therecriticismsmaybevalidforanumberofreasons, butouranalysissuggeststhatthetripartite
arrangement’s inability to accomodate rapid reponses may be optimal if the regulator’s reputation falls in
the range αLD ≤ α < αD.
In a similar vein, imposing term limits for regulators would reduce reputation management. In our
model, replacing the regulator every period would remove the need for reputation management altogether.
However, inamorecomplexmodelwheretheregulatorhastacitknowledgeandlearnsbydoing, therewould
be a tradeoff, and regulatory turnover In reality, since in developed countries at least, public conﬁdence in
ﬁnancial regulation has at least as much to do with the systems that are used to monitor banks as it does
with the personnel that undertake this task, enforcing term limits for regulators may have little impact; and23
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forcing frequent change of regulatory systems is unlikely to be a practical proposition.
5. Auditing Reputation
In Section 4, early closure of a weak bank sends a worse signal about the regulator’s competence than would
be transmitted by the subsequent failure of a bank that was not closed. This allows us to make a clear point
about regulatory forebearance, but it is intuitively hard to believe that a regulator that closed a failing bank
would necessarily fare worse in the court of public opinion than a regulator that identiﬁed a problem early,
and then moved to resolve it. In this section, we introduce a second dimension of regulator reputation, which
is strengthened by the early closure of a bank. We demonstrate that gains to this dimension of reputation can
outweigh the costs of the regulator’s screening ability, and, hence, can ensure that the regulator adopts the
optimal closure policy at time 1. This beneﬁt comes at a cost, though: because failure sends a poor signal
about auditing competence as well as screening ability, the region within which failure causes ﬁnancial
contagion expands.
We now assume that, in addition to its reputation for ex ante screening of banking licence applicants,
the regulator has a reputation for interim auditing of bankers. Regulators can be strong auditors, in which
case they receive a perfect signal of banker type with probability 1, or weak auditors, in which case their
auditing never yields a signal of banker type. The regulator’s auditing skill is independent of its screening
skill.6 The regulator’s auditing type is unknown to regulators and to depositors at time 0, when all agents
assess a common probability λ that the regulator is a strong auditor.
We start by considering the second period. Since the game ends at the end of this period, the regulator
has no reputational concerns and hence closes banks precisely when their interim audit returns a bad signal.
Suppose that the regulator’s screening is wrong with probability w and that depositors assign a posterior
probability λ  that the regulator is a strong auditor. In line with equations (15) and (16), the expected time 1








= UR(w)+(1−π(w))λ (L−RpL). (23)
AsinLemma3,WD(w,λ )andWR(w,λ )aremonotonicallydecreasinginw, withWD(w,λ )<WR(w,λ )
and W 
R(w,λ ) <W 
D(w,λ ); moreover, WD(w,λ ) and WR(w,λ ) are both increasing in the regulator’s pos-
terior reputation λ  for auditing.
As in Section 4, we search for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the audit game. Assume for now that
strong auditors close down weak banks in the ﬁrst period; we exhibit below conditions under which this
assumption is true in equilibrium. Then depositors update their prior that the regulator is a strong auditor
6We do not believe that relaxing this assumption would affect our qualitative conclusions, but it would render the algebra
intractible.24
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Figure 4: Updating of screening and auditing abilities. The regulator’s screening reputation is denoted
α; the prior auditing reputation is λ, and the posterior is λ . The dashed line represents (α,λ ) pairs for
which the depositors are indifferent between depositing and their outside option; the line has a negative
slope because, from the depositors’ point of view, auditing and screening are substitutes.
after bank failure as follows:
λf ≡ P[Strong auditor|Failed bank]
= .
P[Failed bank|strong auditor]P[strong auditor]








To understand this expression, note that strong auditors never allow a weak bank to fail, and hence the
probability of a failed bank when the auditor is strong is the probability π(w) of a strong bank, multiplied
by the probability (1− pH) that it fails.






If the depositors observe a liquidation then they conclude that the regulator is a strong auditor, and their
posterior assessment of λ  i s1.
Simultaneous updating of the ex ante screening reputation α and the ex post auditing reputation λ
introduces some complications into our analysis, which we illustrate in Figure 5. The ﬁgure is a two-
dimensional analogue of Figure 3, illustrating α and λ . The reputations α∗
CD and αLD appear in Proposition
2. Recall that, when there is no updating of the prior λ, depositors are indifferent between depositing and
not depositing for α = αLD; that αL(α∗
CD)=αLD; and that, in equilibrium without λ updating, the regulator
liquidates banks when α < αFBR, that it forebears for αFBR > α ≥ α∗
CD, and that it liquidates for α ≥ α∗
CD.25
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The dashed line on the Figure illustrates the locus of (α,λ ) values for which WD(α,λ )=r; that is, the
locus of points at which the depositors are indifferent between depositing and their outside option. Note that
this line passes through the point (αLD,λ).
We deﬁne α∗∗
CD to be the prior screening reputation for which
WD(αL(α∗∗
CD),1)=r.
That is, when there is updating of the regulator’s auditing ability, α∗∗
CD is the prior screening ability for which
the depositors are indifferent between depositing and their outside option after they have updated both their
prior over the screening reputation and the regulator’s auditing ability λ in the wake of liquidation. Note
that, because the dashed line in Figure 5 slopes downwards, α∗∗
CD < α∗
CD.
When the interim audit uncovers bad news, liquidation is always the optimal strategy for the regulator
when it does not result in second period closure of the banking sector. Moreover, the regulator cannot cred-
ibly commit not to act upon information that the audit uncovers. Lemma 6 therefore follows immediately.
LEMMA 6. When the ﬁrst period audit reveals that the bank is unsound, the regulator always liquidates
when the prior screening reputation α is greater than or equal to α∗∗
CD.
We deﬁne α∗∗




FD is the prior screening reputation at which failure renders the depositors indifferent between
depositing and their outside option, after updating theor prior over screening ability and the regulator’s
outside ability. Note that, because WD(α,λ) is increasing in α, that α∗∗
FD > α∗
FD.
When α ≥ α∗∗
CD, the regulator always liquidates after an audit reveals that the bank is unsound. Hence
bank failure for these α causes the prior auditing reputation λ to be updated to λf, and Lemma 7 follows
immediately.
LEMMA 7. When α∗∗
CD < α ≤ α∗∗
FD, ﬁrst period bank failure causes contagious failure of the the second
period banking system.
Lemma 7 identiﬁes a cost of audit reputation updating: because α∗∗
FD > α∗
FD, the range of prior α values
for which a ﬁrst period bank failure results in the second period failure of the banking sector is greater than
it is when the regulator’s auditing reputation is not updated. On the other hand, because a strong auditing
reputation substitutes for a weak screening reputation, the range of α values for which liquidation occurs in
the wake of a bad ﬁrst period audit is greater.
When α < α∗∗
CD, liquidation of the ﬁrst period bank results in contagious failure of the second period
banking system. The regulator therefore forebears in the circumstances under which it would have done so
in Section 4, and there is no updating of λ.
Proposition summarizes the discussion of this section.
PROPOSITION 3. Let α and λ be the regulator’s period 1 reputations for auditing and screening respec-
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1. If the regulator learns from the ﬁrst period audit that the period 1 bank is unsound then:
(a) If α ≥ α∗∗
CD then the period 1 bank is closed and there is a second period banking sector;
i. If αFBR ≤ α<α∗
CD then the regulator forebears and there is a second period banking sector;
ii. If α < αFBR then the regulator closes down the bank and there is no second period banking
sector.
(b) If the ﬁrst period bank is not closed down then:
i. If α ≥ α∗




CD) ≤ α < α∗∗
FD then there is a second period banking sector if the ﬁrst period
bank succeeds, but ﬁrst period bank failure causes a contagious failure of the second period
banking sector;
iii. If α∗
F ≤ α < α∗∗
CD then there is a second period banking sector whether or not the ﬁrst period
bank succeeds;
iv. If α < α∗
F then there is a second period banking sector if the ﬁrst period bank succeeds, but
ﬁrst period bank failure causes a contagious failure of the second period banking sector.
The introduction of regulator reputations for auditing has two effects. First, it renders the regulator more
willing to liquidate a bank that is revealed by an interim audit to be of low quality. The reason is that such a
liquidation generates a positive signal of auditing ability, which serves to counteract the negative effect upon
screening reputation of a bank closure. Hence the region covered by part 1(a) of Proposition 3 is larger than
the region covered by part 1 of Proposition 2.
The second effect is that the set of α values for which ﬁrst period bank failure causes contagious failure
of the second period banking sector is greater. The reason is that ﬁrst period bank failure is more likely to
be evidence of an unsound bank, and hence to be evidence that the regulator is a poor auditor. When the ﬁrst
period bank fails for an α value at which a poor auditing signal would result in bank closure the regulator’s
reputations for both screening and auditing are impaired, and so contagious bank failure occurs for α values
that would not experience it without an auditing reputation. This effect occurs in the region identiﬁed in part
2(b) of Proposition 3.
6. Conclusion
We have built a model in which investors are unable to reap all the rewards from their investment because
moral hazard and adverse selection create a need for rents and incentive pay in the ﬁnancial sector. A
regulator can try to mitigate these problems, rendering investment more attractive. The regulator’s repuation
- or perceived ability - to solve these problems is therefore an important asset: the size of the ﬁnancial sector
depends upon it. If the regulator’s reputation declines too far, there will be a ﬁnancial crisis as investors’
trust in the system declines and they seek to withdraw their funds. We show that under these circumstances,
it may be valuable for the regulator to be allowed secretly to exercise forbearance towards failing banks in
order to conserve her reputation. Private rescues were not uncommon in the past but are difﬁcult to achieve
when regulation forces transparency and/or required bailouts are very large.
The need for private bailouts can be contrasted with the regulatory response to the recent crisis, when
forbearance was very public. Public forbearance does not conserve the regulator’s reputation ex post and27
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so does not have the same beneﬁts. Therefore, when forbearance is public, it may need to be supplemented
by additional measures such as a tightening of capital requirements or an expansion of deposit insurance if
the ﬁnancial system is to be preserved. These additional measures are costly. Enforcing transparency on
regulators does have an offsetting beneﬁt, however, since it improves investors’ conﬁdence in the system ex
ante as they know that all banks are sound and none are being privately supported by the regulator. Whether
transparency or privacy is optimal ex ante depends on the regulator’s initial reputation and the likely size
of shocks to her reputation. Transparency is essential if the regulator’s reputation is initially very low;
otherwise, privacy and discretion may be socially preferable. In economies where transparency is difﬁcult
to achieve, term limits for regulators may be valuable in order to reduce the need for reputation management.
A separation of powers between the body chartering an auditing banks and the body responsible for closing
or liquidating them may achieve the same end.
The recent trend in ﬁnanial regulation has been towards a levelling of international playing ﬁelds by
implementing common regulation in many different economies (Basle I and Basle II). Whilst common
regulation has many beneﬁts (Acharya 2003, Morrison and White 2009), our model shows that it also has
a cost. Since contagion can occur between banks subject to common regulation (even if those banks have
no interbank linkages and dissimilar assets), there is an argument to be made for maintaining regulatory
diversity, so that not all banks in the ﬁnancial system are subject to the same regulatory shocks.
In reality, the regulator’s incentive to exhibit forbearance is clearly dependent on the systemic implica-
tions of a bank’s failure, including the bank’s size and interconnectedness. Our model is deliberately stark
in order to show that the potential for contagion in our model is independent of these factors. Yet it is easy
to imagine how the model might be extended to incorporate such features. Suppose that the failure of a large
or highly connected bank would cause more disruption to the ﬁnancial system. Then, other things being
equal, the social welfare-maximising regulator of our model should devote more resources to monitoring
such a bank. The failure of such a bank therefore sends a stronger signal about regulatory competence than
the failure of a small unconnected bank, to which the regulator has devoted less time and attention; large
banks failure hence has greater systemic implications than small bank failure. If so, it is be rational for the
regulator to follow a too big to fail policy of forbearing towards large institutions and being tough on small
ones. Similarly, the regulator should forbear more with regard to institutions that it has a long history of
monitoring, and less with regard to relatively young, or foreign, institutions that the regulator has monitored
less and in which it has a smaller reputational stake. This could result in a policy of “too old to fail”.28
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1





















where the ﬁnal inequality follows from equation (3).
Expressions for wD,w R, αD, and αR
wD is found by settingUD(w) equal to r and solving for w. αD is found by substituting the resultant wD into


















Proof of Lemma 2
Write G and B for the respective events that the regulator is good and bad; S and U for the events that the






P{F|G} ≡ φG = P{F|S}P{S|G}+P{F|U}P{U|G}
=
(1− pH)σ (1−γ)+(1− pL)γ(1−σ)
σ −2σγ+γ
,
where the second line follows by setting w=γ in equation (5) to obtain P{S|G}. Similarly, P{F|B}≡φB =
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Substituting for φG and φB yields, after some manipulation, the following equivalent expression:
αF (α)=α
σ (1− pH)(1−γ)+γ(1− pL)(1−σ)
(γ +σ −2γσ)(1−σpH −(1−σ)pL)−α(1−2γ)(1−σ)σΔp
,
from which, after further manipulation, we can derive the following expression:
α 
F (α)=
(σ +γ(1−2σ))(1−(pL+ σΔp)) (σ (1− pH)(1−γ)+γ(1−σ)(1− pL))
((γ +σ −2γσ)(1−σpH −(1−σ)pL)−α(1−2γ)(1−σ)σΔp)
2 .
This is positive, as required.
Proof of Lemma 3



























2 ≤ 0. (29)






> (R−Q)pH > r > L. That of
equation (26) is negative because RpH −C > r > L. The step between equations (27) and (28) follows from
equation (3) as does the ﬁnal inequality of equation (29).
Expressions for wLD,w LR, αLD, and αLR
wLD is found by setting WD(w) equal to r and solving for w. αLD is found by substituting the resultant wLD
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Proof of Lemma 4
Closing the bank reveals for sure that it was unsound. Using the notation of the proof of lemma 2, the









as required. Furthermore, it is tedious but straightforward to demonstrate by direct calculation that
αF (α)−αC(α)=
α(1−α)(1−2γ)((σ +γ(1−2σ))(1− pH)+γ(1−σ)(1−2σ)Δp)







CD is found by setting αL(α)=αLD and solving for α; α∗
CR is found similarly by solving αL(α)=αLR
for α. The calculations are lengthy and the resultant expressions are difﬁcult to read. To aid exposition, we
deﬁne sDG(Q) and sDB(Q) to be the respective surplus which the depositors earn from investing in good and
bad banks, relative to their outside option of r:
sDG(Q)=( R−Q)pH −r;
sDB(Q)=( R−Q)(σpH +(1−λ)(1−σ)pL)+Lλ (1−σ)−r.






Similarly, deﬁne sRG and sRB to be the surplus relative to no bank which regulators derive from an
economy with a bad and a good bank, respectively:
sRG = RpH −r−C;
sRB = R(σpH +(1−λ)(1−σ)pL)+Lλ (1−σ)−Cσ −r.






Derivation of Condition (21)
Forebearance is optimal at α > α∗
FD whenever
RpL+WR(w(αL(α)))−(r+L) > 0. (31)
To obtain condition (21), use equation (30) to substitute α = α∗
CR(Q) in this equation.31
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